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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANkrUPTCY 
GENErAL 
DISCHArGE. The debtor obtained a line of credit with a bank 
to be used to purchase cattle for the debtor’s farming operation. 
The debtor would transfer funds to the general farm account 
but used the funds for gambling instead of buying cattle. The 
bank sought to have the amounts owed under the line of credit 
declared nondischargeable, under Section 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) 
for	false	representations	or	false	financial	statements	to	the	injury	
of the creditor or for embezzlement. The debtor sought summary 
judgment, arguing that the bank could not prove the elements 
of Sections 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). The court acknowledged that 
the	bank	would	have	difficulty	in	proving	all	of	the	elements	but	
denied summary judgment before hearing the evidence. Peoples
State Bank ofAlbia v. knowles, 337 B.r. 680 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 
2005). 
ESTATE PrOPErTY. The debtors were tobacco farmers who 
filed	for	Chapter	11	and	who	expected	to	receive	payments	under	
the tobacco transition payment program after the commencement of 
the case. Under the program, the debtors, as tobacco quota holders, 
were to receive payments to compensate tobacco quota holders 
for the loss of those quotas. The court held that the transition 
payments were property of the estate as proceeds of the quotas 
held by the debtors at the commencement of the case. The debtors, 
as tobacco producers, were also entitled to transition payments if 
they	“shared	in	the	risk	of	production”	of	tobacco.	The	court	held	
that these payments were not property of the estate because the 
debtors’	 “share	 in	 the	 risk	 of	 production”	 for	 pre-petition	 crop	
years	was	not	determined	before	the	filing	of	the	petition	because	
the	statute	was	passed	after	the	filing	of	the	petition.	However,	the	
transition	payments	based	on	the	“share	of	the	risk	of	production”	
which occurred after the enactment of the legislation was estate 
property. The court also ruled on the issue of whether the transition 
payments were subject to creditors’ liens. The court held that there 
were no statutory or regulatory rules against liens on the payments 
once	made	to	the	tobacco	producers	and	quota	holders;	therefore,	
the payments, once made, were subject to creditors’ liens. In re 
Evans, 337 B.r. 551 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2005). 
FEDErAL TAX 
DISCHArGE.	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7	and	received	a	
discharge. However, several years later the debtor was convicted
of bankruptcy fraud for failing to include several assets in the 
bankruptcy schedules. The IRS attempted to collect the taxes 
involved in the bankruptcy case and sought a ruling that the taxes 
were not discharged in the bankruptcy case. The IRS argued that 
the	fraudulent	bankruptcy	filing	was	sufficient	to	prove	that	the	 
debtor attempted to evade payment of the taxes. The debtor argued 
that the Section 523(a)(1)(C) exception to discharge applied only 
to fraudulent attempts to evade a tax liability and did not apply to 
attempts to evade payment of the taxes. The court held that the 
Section 523(a)(1)(C) exception applied to both situations and that 
the taxes were nondischargeable because of the debtor’s fraudulent 
filing	of	the	Chapter	7	case.		United States v.Merrill, 2006-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,280 (D. Or. 2005). 
CONTrACTS 
rESCISSION. The plaintiffs purchased a rural residence from 
the defendants. One month after the purchase, the plaintiffs learned 
that several large wind turbines were going to be constructed on 
neighboring	land	and	filed	an	action	to	rescind	the	contract	for	fraud	
and misrepresentation. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
knew about the wind turbine plans and failed to inform the plaintiffs 
when asked by the plaintiffs whether any development was planned 
in the area. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew that the 
plaintiffs were interested in purchasing the property because of 
the scenic views. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were 
sophisticated buyers who could have and should have discovered 
the construction plans. The court denied summary judgment for the 
defendants	because	 there	were	sufficient	 issues	of	 fact	 to	 justify	
trying the case before a jury. Boyle v. McGlynn, 2006 N.Y. App. 
LEXIS 4533 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006). 
FEDErAL AGrICULTUrAL 
PrOGrAMS 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT. The CFTC charged the 
defendant,	a	registered	futures	commission	merchant,	with	filing	
false reports of cattle sales with the intent to increase the price of 
cattle on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The defendant argued 
that	the	CFTC	reporting	procedures	were	flawed	and	allowed	the	
reporting of possible future sales without allowing corrections of 
those reports when the sales do not occur. Thus, the defendant argued 
that the CFTC was estopped from charging the violations. The court 
held that, although the criticism of the system may be valid, the 
criticism did not prove that the violations did not occur and was not 
proof of CFTC misconduct which would support equitable estoppel 
against the CFTC action. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Delay, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20958 (D. Neb. 2006). 
MAD COW DISEASE. The APHIS has issued a report of an 
analysis of the prevalence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
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(BSE) in the United States. The analysis may be viewed on 
the APHIS web site at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/
hot_issues/bse/bse_in_usa.shtml. 71 Fed. reg. 26019 (May 3, 
2006). 
MILk. The AMS has issued proposed regulations which amend 
the National Organic Program (NOP) regulations to comply with 
the	 final	 judgment	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Harvey v. Johanns, Civil No. 
02-216-P-H (D. Me. June 9, 2005), and to address the November 
10, 2005, amendment made to the Organic Foods Production 
Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 6501 et seq., the OFPA), concerning the 
transition of dairy livestock into organic production. The proposed 
regulations also amend the NOP regulations to clarify that only 
nonorganically produced agricultural products listed in the NOP
regulations may be used as ingredients in or on processed products 
labeled	as	“organic”	or	“made	with	organic	(specified	ingredients	or	
food	group(s)).”	In	accordance	with	the	final	judgment	in	Harvey,
the revision emphasizes that only the nonorganically produced 
agricultural ingredients listed in the NOP regulations can be used 
in	accordance	with	any	specified	restrictions	and	when	the	product	
is not commercially available in organic form. The proposed 
regulations amend the NOP regulations to eliminate the use of up 
to	20	percent	nonorganically	produced	feed	during	the	first	nine	
months of the conversion of a whole dairy herd from conventional 
to organic production. The proposed regulations also allow crops 
and forage from land included in the organic system plan of a 
dairy farm that is in the third year of organic management to be 
consumed by the dairy animals of the farm during the 12-month 
period immediately prior to the sale of organic milk and milk 
products. 71 Fed. reg. 24820 (April 27, 2006). 
PErISHABLE AGrICULTUrAL COMMODITIES ACT. 
The AMS has announced a change in the method of calculating 
the interest to be charged in PACA reparation awards. Since 1992, 
reparation awards have included interest at the rate of 10 percent 
per annum on the basic damage award to provide the injured party 
the full amount of damages sustained. The Secretary ofAgriculture, 
through	 the	 Judicial	 Officer,	 will	 now	assess	 interest	 in	 PACA	
reparation awards consistent with the methodology set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 1961 which sets forth a uniform rate of interest on any 
monetary judgment in a civil case recovered in Federal District 
Court,	 as	 well	 as	 final	 judgments	 against	 the	 United	 States	 in	
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and 
judgments of the United States Court of Federal Claims. 71 Fed. 
reg. 25133 (April 28, 2006). 
TUBErCULOSIS.	The	APHIS	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	
regarding tuberculosis in captive cervids that extend, from two 
years to three, the term for which accredited herd status is valid and 
increase by 12 months the interval for conducting the reaccreditation 
test required to maintain the accredited tuberculosis-free status of 
cervid herds. The regulations also reduce, from three tests to two, 
the	 number	 of	 consecutive	 negative	 official	 tuberculosis	 tests	
required of all eligible captive cervids in a herd before a herd can be 
eligible for recognition as an accredited herd. The regulations also 
remove references to the blood tuberculosis test for captive cervids, 
as that test is no longer used in the tuberculosis eradication program 
for captive cervids. 71 Fed. reg. 24803 (April 27, 2006). 
WETLANDS. The defendant was charged with violating the 
Clean	Water	Act	by	trenching,	grading	or	filling	wetlands.	The	
defendant argued that the land was not covered by the Act. The 
wetlands were adjacent to the St. Clair River, a navigable body 
of water in the United States. The court held that the wetlands 
had	sufficient	nexus	to	the	river	to	be	covered	by	the	Clean	Water	
Act. Note, two similar cases have been consolidated for review 
by the U.S. Supreme which may have rulings in the near future 
which may clarify the extent of jurisdiction of the Clean Water 
Act. United States v. Morrison, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10478 
(6th Cir. 2006). 
FEDErAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
DISCLAIMErS. The decedent’s will provided for the 
residuary estate to pass to an heir who was the director and 
president of a foundation. The will also provided that if the 
heir did not survive the decedent, the residuary passed to the 
foundation.	The	heir	filed	a	written	disclaimer	of	the	residuary	
bequest and the foundation changed its bylaws to create a separate 
fund for the residuary bequest which passed to it by effect of the 
disclaimer. The heir had no control over the separate fund. The 
IRS ruled that the disclaimer was effective and the passing of the 
residuary estate to the foundation was eligible for the charitable 
deduction. Ltr. rul. 200616026, Dec. 22, 2005. 
DISTrIBUTIONS. The decedent’s estate made a distribution 
within 65 days after the end of the estate’s tax year but the 
executor	 failed	 to	file	an	 I.R.C.	§	663(b)	election	 to	have	 the	
distribution treated as made on the last day of the previous tax 
year.	The	IRS	granted	the	estate	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	
election. Ltr. rul. 200617015, Jan. 6, 2006. 
TrUSTS. The taxpayers, decedent and surviving spouse, 
each	created	a	qualified	personal	residence	trust	and	conveyed	
to the trust their one-half interest in a residence. Each trust had 
the	other	grantor	as	income	beneficiary	and	the	couple’s	children	
as	remainder	beneficiaries.	The	trusts	were	terminated	and	the	 
property transferred to revocable trusts without the knowledge 
or	consent	of	the	remainder	beneficiaries.	After	the	death	of	the	 
decedent,	the	claims	of	the	remainder	beneficiaries	were	settled	
with the proceeds of the sale of the residence. The IRS ruled 
that (1) no gift occurred upon the transfer of the QPRTs to the 
revocable trusts, (2) no gift occurred from the payment of the 
residence sale proceeds to the remainder holders because they had 
an enforceable claim against the estate, (3) the basis and holding 
period of the trust grantors carried over to the remainder holders 
for determining the amount and character of the gain from the 
sale of the residence, and (4) the remainder holders were not 
eligible for the I.R.C. § 121 exclusion of gain on the sale of the 
residence. Ltr. rul. 200617002, Jan. 10, 2006. 
The taxpayer transferred a vacation residence to a trust intended 
to	be	a	qualified	personal	residence	trust.	The	property was located 
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on an island that was agricultural, rural and sparsely populated 
and consisted of two contiguous parcels which were a portion 
of a larger tract owned by the taxpayer. The structures on the 
property included a single residence, bathhouse, and pavilion.
The bathhouse consisted of a roof over a small outdoor bathtub 
and the pavilion was a one room structure with no plumbing. 
The size of property was comparable to that of nearby properties 
used for residential purposes. Prior to transferring the property 
to	 the	 trust,	 the	 taxpayer	 granted	 a	 qualified	 conservation	
easement	on	the	property	by	making	a	qualified	conservation	
contribution	with	respect	to	the	property	as	defined	in	I.R.C.	
§	170(h)(1).	The	 IRS	 ruled	 that	 the	 residence	qualified	 as	 a	
personal residence under I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii) and Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)(2). Ltr. rul. 200617035, Dec. 22, 2005. 
FEDErAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ALTErNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, had reported $323,498 of wages, and itemized 
deductions of $39,189 in state and local taxes, $4,935 in real 
estate taxes and $230 in personal property taxes. Taxable income 
was reported as $270,521 with a resulting tax of $70,717. The 
IRS	assessed	a	deficiency	of	$7,364	for	unreported	alternative	
minimum tax. The taxpayers challenged the AMT as confusing 
and complex and subject to criticism by the National Taxpayer 
Advocate. Although the court expressed sympathy for the 
taxpayers’ situation, the court held that the IRS calculation of 
the AMT was in accordance with the statute and regulations. 
Schick v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-67. 
The taxpayer received incentive stock options as part of 
compensation from an employer. The taxpayer exercised the 
options in 2000 and received over $1 million in stock for a 
purchase price of $9,225. However, in 2001, the corporation 
terminated and the stock became worthless. The exercise of 
the stock options resulted in recognition of AMT in 2000 and 
the taxpayer argued that the subsequent loss in 2001 should be 
allowed to reduce the 2000 AMT. The court held that capital 
losses could not be carried back for AMT purposes because 
AMT capital losses were subject to the same restrictions as 
regular tax capital losses. Merlo v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. No. 10 
(2006). 
CASUALTY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed as 
a college professor and suffered the loss of books and other 
office	 items	 in	 a	 fire	 in	 the	 taxpayer’s	 college	 office.	The	
taxpayer claimed a total loss deduction of $33,250, although 
the taxpayer received $12,500 in insurance proceeds from the 
college. The IRS disallowed all but $9,448 of the deduction. 
The taxpayer provided no evidence to support the value of 
or the taxpayer’s basis in the damaged property. The court 
disallowed	 the	 deduction	 for	 a	 manuscript	 of	 an	 unfinished	
book because the taxpayer provided no evidence of expenses 
incurred in producing the manuscript. The deduction for “Labor/
Inconvenience/Distress”	was	disallowed	because	 they	were	 not	
items of property for which a loss deduction was available. The 
court noted that the allowed loss deductions were more than 
adequate after subtracting the insurance proceeds from the allowed 
claimed losses. The court also upheld the imposition of the 20 
percent penalty for understatement of tax because the taxpayer 
failed to seek any professional or expert advice as to the properly 
allowed loss deductions. Ayittey v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2006-65. 
DEDUCTIONS.	The	taxpayer	owned	two	accounting	firms	and	
was president of an S corporation owned by the taxpayer’s spouse 
and children. The S corporation provided marketing services for the 
accounting	firms.	The	S	corporation	paid	the	taxpayer’s	personal	
mortgage interest, real estate taxes and condominium fees. The 
payments were marked as loans on the corporation’s books but there 
was not written evidence to support the loan nature of the payments. 
The court disallowed the deductions on the taxpayer’s personal 
tax return because the amounts were paid by the corporation and 
not the taxpayer. The court held that the payments were not loans 
for lack of substantiation. rappaport v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2006-87. 
DEPrECIATION. The taxpayer was a real estate developer 
who owned a low-income rental housing project. The taxpayer 
intended to use the Alternative Depreciation System (ADS) rather 
than	the	modified	accelerated	cost	recovery	system	(MACRS)	to	
depreciate the project property. The taxpayer had a tax opinion 
letter	 and	 financial	 projection	 prepared	 using	ADS;	 however,	
the income tax return claimed depreciation deductions based on 
MACRS because of a tax return preparer error. The IRS granted the 
taxpayer	an	extension	of	time	to	file	an	amended	return	using	the	
ADS for claiming depreciation deductions. Ltr. rul. 200617013, 
Jan. 6, 2006. 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The taxpayer corporation adopted 
a	 “bonus	 plan”	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 qualified	 performance-based	
compensation plan under I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) and Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-27(e). The plan provided that the taxpayer reserved the 
right to pay discretionary bonuses outside of the plan but provided 
that no employee had a guaranteed right to a discretionary bonus. 
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s reservation of the right to pay 
discretionary bonuses outside the plan would not prevent the plan 
from qualifying as a performance-based compensation plan under 
I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e). Ltr. rul. 
200617018, Jan. 18, 2006. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, sold their 
manufacturing company and moved to California. The taxpayers 
had substantial investment income but wanted to farm as part of 
their retirement lifestyle. The taxpayers planted lemon tree orchards 
on their rural property. The orchard operation produced only losses 
which were used to offset some of the investment income. The 
court held that the orchard operation was not entered into with the 
intent	to	make	a	profit,	preventing	the	deduction	of	expenses	in	
excess of revenues, because (1) the taxpayers did not operate the 
orchards in a businesslike manner because the taxpayers did not 
maintain	sufficiently	complete	and	accurate	records	to	analyze	the	 
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profitability	of	the	operation	or	to	change	the	operation	to	make	it	
profitable;	(2)	the	taxpayers	did	not	have	any	expertise	in	lemon	
orchards	and	did	not	seek	expert	advice	more	than	once;	(3)	the	
taxpayers did not devote a substantial amount of time to the 
activity;	(4)	there	was	no	proof	that	the	taxpayers	expected	the	
orchards	to	appreciate	in	value;	(5)	although	the	taxpayers	had	
successfully built other businesses, those businesses had little 
in common with lemon orchards, and the taxpayer were also 
involved	 in	 several	 unsuccessful	 businesses;	 (6)	 the	 orchards	
produced	no	profitable	years;	(7)	the	losses	from	the	orchards	
offset	substantial	income	from	other	sources;	and	(8)	the	orchards	
were started to create a retirement lifestyle, a form of personal 
pleasure. Bangs v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-83. 
HYBrID VEHICLE TAX CrEDIT. Effective for vehicles 
placed in service after December 31, 2005, an alternative motor 
vehicle	credit	is	allowed	which	is	the	sum	of	(1)	qualified	fuel	
cell motor vehicle credit, (2) advanced lean burn technology 
motor	vehicle	credit,	(3)	qualified	hybrid	motor	vehicle	credit,	
and	(4)	qualified	alternative	fuel	motor	vehicle	credit.	I.R.C.	§	
30B(a). The credits allowed cannot exceed the regular tax reduced 
by other credits over the tentative minimum tax for the year. 
I.R.C. § 30B(g)(2). The credits are treated as a general business 
credit if the vehicle is subject to an allowance for depreciation. 
I.R.C. § 30B(g)(1). The IRS has announced the hybrid vehicle 
certifications	and	the	credit	amounts	for: 
Year and Model Credit Amount 
2007 Toyoto Camry Hybrid $2,600
2007 Lexus GS 450h $1,550
See Harl, “Additional Items in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
16 Agric. L. Dig. 131 (2005). Ir-2006-67. 
INCOME. The taxpayer operated a farm which included 
a dairy and crop land. When the taxpayer sold milk, cattle or 
crops, the taxpayer would instruct the buyer to issue payment 
checks to the taxpayer’s sons. The taxpayer did not include the 
amounts paid to the sons in taxable income. The taxpayer was 
assessed	 a	 deficiency	 based	 upon	 the	 IRS	 reconstruction	 of	
income through the records of the buyers and the assessment was 
upheld by the court. The court also upheld assessment of a fraud 
penalty for the taxpayer’s attempts to hide income by having the 
checks made out to the taxpayer’s sons. The court upheld the 
IRS disallowance of deductions and losses because the taxpayer 
failed to provide evidence to support the deductions and losses. 
Hoover v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-82. 
IrA. The taxpayer was 57 years old and owned an IRA funded 
with rollover funds from an employer pension plan. The taxpayer 
received	annual	payments	from	the	IRA	determined	by	a	fixed	
amortization method using the taxpayer’s life expectancy, using 
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9, and a reasonable rate of interest. 
The taxpayer recalculated the payment each year based on the 
balance in the IRA, the taxpayer’s life expectancy and an interest 
rate less than 120 percent of the federal mid-term rate. The IRS 
ruled that the calculation method resulted in substantially equal 
periodic payments under I.R.C. §§ 72(t)2)(A)(iv), (t)(4). Ltr. 
rul. 200616045, Jan. 27, 2006. 
INTErEST. The taxpayer, an S corporation, owned water 
Agricultural Law Digest 
rights which were used by its customers for irrigation of rice 
crops.	The	S	corporation	election	had	been	filed	in	January	1997	
and the water rights were sold in January 1999. The taxpayer 
reported built-in gains based upon the value of the water rights 
as of the date of the S corporation election and the IRS rejected 
the 1997 valuation used to determine the amount of built-in 
gain as too low, based on the sale price of the water rights in 
the subsequent sale. The Tax Court determined the value of the 
water rights as of the S corporation election date based upon the 
reasonable expectation of the value of the water rights given the 
commercial expectations at that time for the types of use and 
price for water in January 1997. See Garwood Irrigation Co. v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-195. The result in that case required 
the repayment of tax to the taxpayer and the IRS applied the 
interest rate of I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1)(B) for corporations to the 
refund of the overpayment of tax. The taxpayer argued that 
the higher interest rate for noncorporate taxpayers, in I.R.C. § 
6621(a)(1) should have been used. Although the court agreed 
that the 0.5 percent interest rate applied to large corporate 
overpayments did not apply to S corporations, the court held that 
the taxpayer was limited to the 2 percent interest rate of I.R.C. 
§ 6621(a)(1)(B) because the statute did not limit the rate to C 
corporations. Garwood Irrigation Co. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 
No. 12 (2006). 
LIkE-kIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayers were an S 
corporation and a trust which were related parties under I.R.C. 
§ 1031(f)(3). Each taxpayer owned a building and the trust sold 
its building and purchased the corporation’s building using a 
qualified	intermediary.	The	qualified	intermediary	acquired	the	
corporation’s building and transferred it to the trust in exchange 
for the trust’s building, sold the trust building and acquired 
replacement property for the corporation with the proceeds of 
the	sale.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	exchange	qualified	for	like-kind	
exchange deferment of gain so long as neither taxpayer disposed 
of their buildings within two years. Ltr. rul. 200616005, Dec. 
22, 2005. 
PENSION PLANS. I.R.C. § 402A provides for the treatment 
of elective Roth deferrals as designated Roth contributions 
effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2006. Rev. 
Proc. 2005-66, I.R.B. 2005-37, 509 (Section 5.05(3)), requires 
plan sponsors to comply with the requirement to timely adopt a 
discretionary amendment by the end of the plan year in which 
the amendment is effective. The IRS has published a sample 
plan amendment for sponsors, practitioners, and employers who 
want to provide for designated Roth contributions in their I.R.C. 
§ 401(k) plans. The sample amendment is intended to help plan 
sponsors meet this requirement. Notice 2006-44, I.r.B. 2006-
19. 
The taxpayer had an I.R.C. § 401(k) pension plan with a state 
employer and received a distribution from the plan which was 
used to pay the taxpayer’s spouse’s higher education expenses 
in the year of distribution. The taxpayer included the distribution 
in taxable income but did not pay the 10 percent additional 
tax, arguing that the taxpayer was informed by several Internal 
Revenue Service employees that the educational expense 
exception applied. The court held that the exception allowed in 
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I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) applied only to individual retirement plans 
and	not	to	distributions	from	I.R.C.	§	401(k)	plans;	therefore,	
the distribution was subject to the 10 percent penalty for early 
withdrawal. Barbee v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-71. 
The taxpayer was employed as a boiler mechanic and was 
required to perform heavy labor. The heavy labor eventually 
caused injury to the taxpayer such that the taxpayer was unable
to continue employment. The employer offered the taxpayer an 
early retirement and distributed the taxpayer’s entire pension 
plan to the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the distribution 
was not subject to the 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal 
because the distribution was made when the taxpayer was 
disabled. Although the taxpayer was receiving treatment for the 
injuries and pain, no medical prognosis was available as when 
the taxpayer could work again. The court held that the inability to 
predict	when	the	taxpayer	could	return	to	work	was	sufficient	to	
classify the disability as permanent and the distribution eligible 
for the disability exception to the 10 percent penalty for early 
distributions. rideaux v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-
74. 
rETUrNS. The IRS has issued interim guidance relating to 
making or revoking certain elections provided by the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-357): (1) the election 
under I.R.C. § 40(g)(6) to allocate a cooperative’s small ethanol 
producer credit among its patrons on the basis of quantity or 
value	 of	 business	 done	 with	 the	 patrons	 during	 the	 tax	 year;	
(2) the election under I.R.C. § 167(g)(7) to include or exclude 
participations and residuals in the adjusted basis of property under 
the	income	forecast	depreciation	method;	(3)	the	election	under	
I.R.C. § 168(i)(16)(B)(ii) to treat Alaska natural gas pipeline as 
7-year	property;	(4)	the	election	under	I.R.C. § 179B to deduct 
75	percent	of	qualified	capital	costs	incurred	by	a	small	business	
refiner	to	comply	with	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency’s	
Highway	Diesel	Fuel	Sulfur	Control	guidelines;	(5)	the	election	
under I.R.C. § 181	to	treat	the	cost	of	a	qualified	film	or	television	
production	as	a	currently	deductible	expense;	 (6)	 the	election	
under I.R.C. § 194(b) to expense up to $10,000 of reforestation 
expenditures;	(7)	the	election	under	I.R.C. § 451(i) to recognize 
gain from a qualifying electric transmission transaction ratably 
over	8	years;	 (8)	 the	 revocation	of	an	election	under	 I.R.C. § 
631(a)	to	treat	the	cutting	of	timber	as	a	sale	or	exchange;	(9)	
the election under I.R.C. § 864(f)	 by	 a	 worldwide	 affiliated	
group to allocate interest expense on a worldwide basis and the 
election	to	expand	the	financial	institution	group	of	a	worldwide	
affiliated	group;	(10)	the	election	under	I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(H)(ii)
to treat foreign tax paid or accrued in tax years beginning after 
December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2007, on an amount 
that does not constitute income for U.S. tax purposes as imposed 
on	general	limitation	income	or	financial	services	income;	and	
(11) the election under I.R.C. § 986(a)(1)(D) that allows taxpayers 
that otherwise must translate foreign income tax payments at the 
average exchange rate to elect to use the exchange rate in effect 
on the date the taxes are paid. Notice 2006-47, I.r.B. 2006-19. 
MEDICAID 
LIEN. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident 
and received medical treatment paid for by Medicaid, totalling
$215,645.30. State law required the plaintiff to assign to the 
state Medicaid agency her “right to any settlement, judgment, or 
award”	she	may	receive	from	third	parties,	“to	the	full	extent	of	
any	amount	which	may	be	paid	by	Medicaid	for	 the	benefit	of	
the	applicant.”		A	few	years	later,	the	plaintiff	received	$550,000	
as the result of a settlement of the litigation involving the auto 
accident. That total included amounts for past and future pain 
and suffering, medical claims, loss of earnings and working 
time, and the plaintiff’s permanent inability to earn income in the 
future. Only $35,581 of the settlement proceeds were for medical 
expenses, but the state Medicaid agency asserted a lien against
the proceeds for $215,645.30 - the full amount it had paid for the 
plaintiff’s care. The plaintiff reasoned that the state’s Medicaid 
recovery was limited by federal law to third-party payments 
for health care services. The state Medicaid agency argued that
its	lien	did	not	conflict	with	federal	law,	because	the	plaintiff’s	
third	party	settlement	was	not	her	“property”	until	the	state	was	
fully reimbursed for all funds expended on medical care. The 
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the federal Medicaid 
law did not authorize the state to assert a lien on the plaintiff’s 
settlement in an amount exceeding the $35,000 for medical care, 
and that the federal anti-lien provision actually barred the state
from doing so. The next issue of the Digest will publish an article 
by Roger McEowen on this case. Arkansas Department of 
Health and Human Services, et al. v. Ahlborn, No. 04-1506, 
2006 U.S. LEXIS 3455 (May 1, 2006), aff’g, 397 F.3d 620 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
NUISANCE 
rIGHT-TO-FArM. The plaintiffs purchased a residential 
lot in an existing residential subdivision which was adjacent to 
an apple orchard purchased by the defendants after the plaintiffs 
purchased their lot, although the orchard had been in existence for 
over 50 years. Six years later, the defendants converted the apple 
trees to cherry trees. The fruit suffered damage from birds so the 
defendants made use of propane canons and cherry guns to frighten 
away the birds. The noise guns were in operation during daylight 
hours from May through July and some of the guns were within 100 
feet of the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs sought an injunction 
against the use of the noise guns as a public nuisance. The plaintiffs 
argued that state and local right-to-farm laws prohibited the suit. 
The trial court dismissed the suit and ruled that although state law 
did not prevent the suit, a county ordinance favored the defendants. 
On appeal the defendants argued that the orchard existed prior to 
the	plaintiffs’	occupancy	of	 their	property;	 therefore,	 the	right-
to-farm law and ordinance applied to prevent the suit. The court 
held that the change of the orchard from apples to cherries and the 
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new use of noise guns after the plaintiffs occupied their property 
removed the orchard from protection by the right-to-farm law and 
ordinance;	therefore,	the	trial	court	improperly	dismissed	the	suit.	
The appellate court remanded the case for entry of judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Davis v. Taylor, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 
712 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
PrODUCT LIABILITY 
SEEDS. The plaintiffs were farmers who purchased cotton seed 
from	the	defendant.		The	plaintiffs	filed	suit	in	negligence,	breach	
of warranty, fraud and interference with business relationship 
to recover losses from alleged inferior cotton seed which did 
not produce normal yields. The bags of cotton seed contained a 
written notice that Mississippi law, Miss. Code § 69-3-19, requires 
seed	buyers	to	first	file	complaints	that	the	seed	did	not	perform	
as represented with the Mississippi Department of Agriculture 
for	 non-binding	 arbitration	 before	 filing	 any	 suit	 for	 damages	
in court. The plaintiffs argued that their suit was not about the 
failure of the seed to perform as represented on the label but was 
about the negligence of the defendant in producing, testing and 
maintaining the seed. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
labels did not make any representations as to the performance 
of	the	seed;	therefore,	they	were	not	required	by	Mississippi	law	
to	file	an	administrative	complaint	before	filing	a	court	suit.	The	
court noted that the law had been amended since the cotton seeds 
were purchased to include complaints about the condition of the 
seed. Thus, the court reasoned, the law of this case restricted the 
administrative complaint requirement only for complaints involving 
representations of performance on the label. Because the suit did 
not allege any actions as to the representations on the cotton seed 
labels,	the	plaintiffs	were	not	required	to	first	bring	an	administrative	
complaint	before	filing	suit.		Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Burns, 
2006 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 2006). 
SECUrED TrANSACTIONS 
MErCHANT. The defendant was a farmer who purchased a 
membership interest in the plaintiff cooperative. The defendant 
purchased feed, fuel and other farm supplies on account from the 
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plaintiff.	The	monthly	 statements	 stated	 that	 a	 finance	 charge	
would	 be	 assessed	 on	 unpaid	 balances.	 That	 finance	 charge	
was increased from 1.5 percent to 2 percent during the time the 
defendant owed money on the account. When the defendant 
stopped	making	payments	on	the	account,	the	plaintiff	filed	suit	to	
recover the balance on the account, which included the 2 percent 
finance	 charges.	The	 trial	 court	 ruled	 that	 the	 transaction	was	
between	merchants,	 that	 the	finance	charge	was	an	element	of	
the contract between the parties, and that the plaintiff’s recovery 
included	 the	 finance	 charges.	The	defendant	 argued	 that	Ohio	
Rev. Code § 1343.03(A) limited the interest rate to 10 percent 
per year. The court held that Section 1343.03(A) allowed a higher 
interest	rate	to	be	agreed	to	by	the	parties	to	a	contract;	therefore,	
the defendant was subject to the 24 percent finance charge 
listed on each account statement. However, the court held that 
the compounding of the interest was not proper and remanded 
the case for recalculation of the interest at 24 percent per year 
without monthly compounding. Minster Farmer’s Cooperative 
Exchange Co., Inc. v. Dues, 2006 OhioApp. LEXIS 1720 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2006). 
IN THE NEWS 
An accountant has been acquitted by a jury of a charge of 
aiding	and	abetting	false	tax	filings.		The	accountant	claimed	that	
clients could not be taxed on their salaries because the amounts 
represent a non-taxable return of labor (i.e., there is an exhaustion 
factor for labor just as there is for a depreciable asset - people, 
just like depreciable machines, wear out). The accountant listed 
a nontaxable income deduction on the clients’ tax returns equal 
to their reported wages and business income. The salaries were 
reported on line 7 of the 1040 and an offsetting loss in the same 
amount was claimed on line 21. This is the typical tax protestor 
argument and it has now been given merit by this jury. The 
accountant was acquitted of all 36 counts against him. The jury 
felt that the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accountant did not truly believe that the clients were 
not entitled to the deduction. United States v. Petrino, (E.D. 
N.Y. May 2, 2006), 2006 TNT 87-7, May 5, 2006. Tax Analysts, 
Tax Notes Today, MAY 5, 2006. 
